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COMPARATIVE REFLECTIONS ON THE "NEW 
MATRIMONIAL JURISPRUDENCE" OF THE 
ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCHt 
Charles Donahue, Jr.,:, 
A recent review1 of some developments in the law of the Roman 
Catholic Church2 concerning the annulment of marriages suggested 
to me that these developments might be of interest to an audience 
wider than that composed of those professionally or religiously con-
cerned with the activities of the Church's tribunals. In particular, 
these developments may reveal something about the problem of in-
corporating the findings of modern psychology and psychiatry into 
a legal system, about the ways courts behave when confronted with 
social change, and perhaps even about the problematic relationship 
between law and morality. What follows, then, is a series of reflec-
tions, by no means exhaustive, from one who does not pretend to 
be expert in modern canon law, or in modern secular family law, 
or in the relationship between law and psychiatry, and thus feels per-
fectly competent to offer reflections on all three. 
I. 
Of all branches of Western Christianity the Roman Catholic 
Church is perhaps the most juridically inclined. She has a code, the 
1917 Code of Canon Law,3 modeled in form, if not in substance, 
after the great continental secular law codes of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Behind this code lies a tradition, dating 
back at least to the twelfth century and continuing today, of academic 
study of _canon law.4 There is also a bar of canon lawyers, partic-
t Copyright© Charles Donahue, Jr. 1976, 1977. 
* Professor of Law, The University of Michigan. A.B. 1962, Harvard Univer-
sity; LL.B. 1965, Yale University.-Ed. 
1. Donahue, Scandal and the Church's New Matrimonial Jurisprudence, LAw & 
JUSTICE (forthcoming). 
2. The "Roman" is important. The law to which we will be referring applies 
only to Latin-rite Catholics who are in communion with Rome. It does not, at least 
of its own force, apply to Catholics of the various Eastern rites even if they are in 
communion with Rome, much less to the Eastern Orthodox or Protestant churches. 
Hereinafter a reference to "the Church" will mean the Roman Catholic Church. 
3. CODEX Iurus CANONIC! (1919) [hereinafter cited as CoDE with canon number]. 
4. In the universities of medieval and, to a certain extent, early modern Europe, 
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ularly strong in those European countries which are predominately 
Catholic, 5 and there is a court system, with a pyramidal structure that 
begins at the diocesan level and culminates in the Rota and the 
Apostolic Signature in Rome. 6 
Historically, ecclesiastical courts had a wide jurisdiction. In 
medieval England, for example, they heard cases concerning mar-
riage, defamation, ecclesiastical property, contracts (at least in some 
periods), wills, and the administration of estates.7 With the growth 
of the modern secular state, the ecclesiastical courts lost most of their 
jurisdiction to secular tribunals. Today, in most Western countries, 
even in those without a strong tradition of separation of church and 
state, the courts of the Catholic Church concern themselves prin-
cipally with the internal administration of the Church (a jurisdiction 
principally if not exclusively of interest to clerics) and marriage. 
The secular effect of the judgments of the Church's courts con-
cerning marriage varies widely from country to country. In plural-
istic countries such as our own these judgments have no secular ef-
fect. Secular marriage law is administered by secular courts, and 
the judgments of the Church's courts have effect only within the 
Church. Some countries, however, by agreement with the Vatican, 
accord some recognition to the judgments of the Church's courts.8 
Whatever the situation with regard to the secular effect of the 
judgments of the Church's tribunals, within the Church the judg-
ments of secular tribunals concerning the marital status of Catholics 
have no effect. With a few exceptions, the only determinations con-
cerning marital status that have effect within the Church are those 
made by ecclesiastical tribunals. This fact should not be intuitively 
obvious, because marriage is virtually the only issue affecting Catho-
lic laymen of which it is true. 
canon law had a stature rivaling that of Roman law. See generally P. ANDRIEU-
GuITRANCOURT, INTRODUCTION SOMMAIRE A L'ETUDE DU DROIT EN GENERAL ET DU 
DROIT CANONIQUE CONTEMPORAIN EN PARTICULIER 1282-318 ( 1963). 
5. For the history of the canonic bar, see J. NOONAN, POWER To DISSOLVE 55-
60 (1972). 
6. For a description of the system, see N. DEL RE, LA CuRIA ROMANA 227-59 (Sus-
sidi Eruditi no. 23, 3d ed. 1970) (the Rota and the Signature); 2 S. WoYWOD, A 
PRACTICAL COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW 229-36 (C. Smith rev. 1952) 
(the diocesan and archdiocesan tribunals). 
1. See generally Donahue, Roman Canon Law in the Medieval English Church: 
Stubbs vs. Maitland Re-examined After 75 Years in the Light of Some Records from 
the Church Courts, 72 MICH. L. REV. 647 (1974). 
8. Countries which seem to accord some secular recognition to the judgments of 
the Church's courts in marriage cases include Colombia, the Dominican Republic, 
Italy, Portugal, and Spain. See G. PRADER, IL MARTIMONIO NEL MONDO 16, 22, 151, 
177, 324, 442, 457 (1970). For the history of the agreements between the Vatican 
and the various states, see F. CONCI, LA CHIESA EI VARI STATI (1954). 
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Like most Western Churches, the Catholic Church has a moral 
code. This code is not the same thing as the Church's canon law, 
although the Church strives to keep her canon law consistent with 
her moral code. The enforcement of the moral code is a matter 
for the internal forum, to be dealt with between priest and penitent 
in the privacy of the confessional. Thus, if a Catholic commits 
murder or fraud he will, in addition to answering before a secular 
tribunal, have to square his conscience with his God by confessing 
his sin to a priest. In the case of marriage, however, and for all 
practical purposes only in the case of marriage, a Catholic's case must 
be brought not only before the secular forum but also before the ex-
ternal forum (the courts) of the church. 
The enforcement of the requirement for a judgment in the ex-
ternal forum is grounded in the rule that a Catholic may not validly 
marry except before a priest ·and two witnesses. 0 If he does not so 
marry and lives with his putative spouse, he is commiting the sin of 
fornication or adultery, and, as is the case with all serious sins, he 
may not be a communicant in the Church until he ceases the practice 
and is absolved of his sin.1° Further, a Catholic may not licitly marry 
a second time "until the nullity or dissolution of the former [mar-
riage] shall have been established according to law and with cer-
tainty."11 With a few exceptions (most notably where the former 
spouse has died), this means that he must obtain a formal judgment 
from an eccleiastical tribunal.12 Unless the individual does so, a 
priest may not assist at the second marriage. Thus, for most prac-
tical purposes, a Catholic must bring a case in a Church court in 
order validly to remarry and remain a communicant in his Church.13 
Leaving aside the complex question of why it is that marriage 
questions alone among all the legal and moral issues with which a 
Catholic layman can become involved must be resolved in the ex-
ternal forum, 14 let us look at the law applied by that forum. The 
9. CODE, supra note 3, canon 1094. 
10. Cf. J • .ABBO & T. HANNAN, THE SACRED CANONS 263 (2d rev. ed. 1970). 
11. CODE, supra note 3, canon 1069, § 2. 
12. See T. BouscAREN, A. ELLIS & F. KoRm, CANON LAw 538-41 (4th rev. ed. 
1963). 
13. In addition to this indirect enforcement mechanism which applies throughout 
the Church, a Catholic in the United States incurs excommunication ipso facto if 
he attempts remarriage after obtaining a secular judgment of divorce. See T. 
BouscAREN, supra note 12, at 943. The American Catholic bishops have recently 
voted to abrogate this provision. N.Y. Times, May 6, 1977, at Al2, col. 1. 
14. The Church has long claimed primary jurisdiction over the marriage of bap-
tized persons because of the sacramental nature of marriage and, more broadly, be-
cause of the Church's general jurisdiction over the religious affairs of the baptized. 
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fundamental principle is stated baldly: "A valid marriage, ratified 
and consummated, can be dissolved by no human power and for no 
cause, save death."15 Because the Church does not allow bigamy, 
the only way a Catholic can remarry while his former spouse is still 
living is by showing that his prior marriage was invalid, not ratified, 
not consummated, or, to the extent that this differs from invalidity, 
that it was not a marriage. 
This fundamental principle, that marriages are indissoluble, rests 
on the New Testament. That Jesus taught that marriages are indis-
soluble can hardly be denied.16 There are few specific legal points 
on which his teaching is so clear, except perhaps his flexibility with 
regard to the rules concerning the Sabbath. That St. Paul, despite 
this teaching, felt that he could create an exception on his own au-
thority also seems reasonably clear.17 Today we say that the 
"Pauline privilege" for converts to Christianity whose spouses remain 
non-Christian involves the dissolution not of sacramental ("rati-
fied"), but only of non-sacramental ("unratified") marriages.18 Paul 
did not so characterize this exception, although the sharp cleavage 
between the natural and the supernatural order in Paul's writing 
makes this explanation Pauline in spirit.19 
See 2 J. ABBO & T. HANNAN, supra note 10, at 170-72: Further, she has sought to 
obtain seoolar recognition of the judgments of the Church courts in marriage matters 
in those countries with which she has a concordat, an effort that has been successful 
in some countries. 'See note 8 supra. The arguments for the Church's continuing to 
treat marriage cases in the external forum include the following: (1) in those coun-
tries where the judgment has secular effect, the judgments must be made in an ex-
ternal, legal forum; (2) since marriage is eminently a public matter, it must be judged 
publicly; (3) of all the heads of jurisdiction conceded to the Church courts histor-
ically, this was the most universal and hence the last to fall before the courts of the 
modern secular state. See, e.g., Manchester, The- Reform of the Ecclesiastical Courts, 
10 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 51 (1966). 
15. CODE, supra note 3, canon 1118. 
16. Mark 10:2-12; Luke 16:18; Matthew 5:31-32, 19:3-9. 
17. For the married I have something to say, and this is not from me but from 
the Lord: a wife must not leave her husband-or if she does leave him, she 
must either remain unmarried or else make it up with her husband-nor must 
a husband send his wife away. 
The rest is from me and not from the Lord. If a brother has a wife who 
is an unbeliever, and she is content to live with him, he must not send her away; 
and if a woman has an unbeliever for her husband, and he is content to live 
with her, she must not leave him. This is because the unbelieving husband is 
made one with the saints through his wife, and the unbelieving wife is made 
one with the saints through her husband. If this were not so, your children 
would be unclean, whereas in fact they are holy. However, if the unbelieving 
partner does not consent, they may separate; in these circumstances, the brother 
or sister is not tied: God has called you to a life of peace. If you are a 
wife, it may be your part to save your husband, for all you know; if a husband, 
for all you know, it may be your part to save your wife. 
1 Corinthians 7:10-16 (Jerusalem Bible). 
18. See J. NOONAN, supra note 5, at 342-47. 
19. Cf. Dau be, Pauline Contributions to a Pluralistic Culture: Re-creation and 
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That Jesus himself allowed no exception to the indissolubility of 
marriage is a proposition more difficult to establish. The problem 
is created by the except clauses in Matthew 5:3220 and 19:9.21 The 
literature on the topic is vast, and none of the resolutions-either 
for or against the proposition that the author of Matthew meant to 
indicate that divorce and remarriage were permissible in a limited 
class of cases-seems totally satisfying intellectually.22 Whatever 
the Matthean passages mean, however, the unqualified prohibitions 
of divorce and remarriage in Mark 10:2-12 and Luke 16:18 and 
the virtually unanimous opinion of the Church fathers23 ( a group 
not known for unanimity) to the same effect create a powerful bias 
in favor of the indissolubility of marriage. 
The rule that marriages once made are indissoluble became an 
essential part of the law of the Roman Catholic Church. It was re-
affirmed officially at the time of the Council of Trent (1563)24 and 
has been reaffirmed on numerous occasions since. 25 
The institution of marriage, however, has undergone great 
changes, perhaps none greater than those of the last hundred 
years.26 The family is no longer so important an economic in-
stitution as it was in the past, and its shape has changed from ex-
tended to nuclear. Perhaps as a result of these two phenomena, 
roles within the family are no longer clearly defined. We may de-
cry these developments or welcome them, but they are clearly part 
of the framework within which any modern church must operate. 
Beyond, in 2 JESUS AND MAN'S HOPE 223 (Pittsburg Festival on the Gospels, Pitts-
burg Theological Seminary, D. Miller & D. Hadidian eds. 1971). 
20. "[E]veryone who divorces his wife, except for the case of fornication, makes 
her an adulteress; and anyone who marries a divorced woman commits adultery." 
(Jerusalem Bible) 
21. "[T]he man who divorces his wife-I am not speaking of fornication-and 
marries another, is guilty of adultery." (Id.) 
22. Convenient summaries and references may be found in D. SHANER, A CHRIS· 
TIAN VIEW OF DIVORCE 43-57 (1969); Ambrozic, lndissolubility of Marriage in the 
New Testament: Law or Ideal, 6 STIJDIA CANONICA 269 (1972). 
23. For a definitive study of the matter, see H. CROUZEL, L'EGLISE PRIMITIVE 
FACE AU DIVORCE (Theologie Historique no. 13, 1971). 
24. Council of Trent, Decree Tametsi (1563), in H. DENZIGER & A. ScHoNMETZ· 
ER, ENCHlRIDION SYMBOLORUM No. 1797, at 415 (36th ed. 1976); cf. Professio fidei 
Waldensibus praescripta (1208), in id. No. 794, at 257. 
25. E.g., Benedict XIV, Constitution Nuper ad nos (1743), in id. No. 2536, at 
504; Pius IX, "Syllabus of Errors" No. 67 (1864), in id. No. 2967, at 583; Leo 
XIII, Encyclical Arcanum divinae sapientiae (1880), in id. No. 3142, at 612; John 
XXIII, Encyclical Pacem in terris (1963), in id. No. 3962, at 804. 
26. See generally E. ScHILLEBEECKX, MARRIAGE: HUMAN REALilY AND SAVING 
MYSTERY XV·XXX (N.D. Smith trans. 1965); J. DOMINIAN, MARITAL BREAKDOWN 
(1968). 
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The Church has reacted to these developments in different ways 
at different times over the past century. Most recently, the trend 
has been toward a reformulation of the traditional theology of mar-
riage. This reformulation, at least in its official manifestations, does 
not undercut the Church's traditional view of the indissolubility of 
marriage; instead, it de-emphasizes the traditional teaching that the 
procreation and education of children is the primary end of marriage, 
and places more emphasis on the spiritual meaning of the expression 
of conjugal love. Further, the notion of marital consent has been 
given expanded meaning: the emphasis is now on the mutual self-
giving of husband and wife at the expense of a more precise, but 
perhaps more sterile, contractual conception of consent. 27 
Thus, the removal of the support given marriage by its economic 
function, by the extended family, and by the resulting clearly defined 
roles for members of the family has enabled the Church to empha-
size the spiritual nature of the marriage bond. This removal of sup-
port, however, has also placed the institution of marriage in great 
peril. Marital -breakdown is now more frequent than ever before. 
How frequent is a matter of debate; the statistics suggest that in 
this country between one in six and one in three marriages ends in 
divorce. 28 The extent to which changes in the civil law of divorce 
have enhanced this problem is also a matter of debate, 29 but in any 
event the secular law of divorce is also part of the framework within 
which any modern church must operate. 
This, then, is the problem of the ecclesiastical courts today: 
marital breakdowns occur frequently, and people obtain civil di-
vorces. In virtually no case that comes before an ecclesiastical tribu-
nal today is there any hope of reconciliation of the original couple. 
At least in countries with relatively relaxed standards for secular di-
vorce, a large proportion of the people who come before the eccle-
siastical courts have already married again outside the Church, and 
the dissolution of this new union may be legally, financially, and 
psychologically impossible, even if it could be morally justified. 
27. These developments are perhaps best seen in the Constitutio pastoralis, De 
Ecclesia in mundo huius temporis (Pastoral Constitution, On the Church in the Mod-
em World) pt. 2, ch. 1 (1965), in CONCILIORUM OECUMENICORUM DECRETA 1100-
06 (J. Alberigo et al. eds., 3d ed. 1973), translated in THE DocUMENTS OF VATICAN 
II 249-58 (W. Abbott ed. 1966). 
28. For the reasons why such a seemingly simple statistic turns out to be so dif-
ficult to obtain, see McHugh, No-Fault Divorces, 35 THE JURIST 18-19 (1975), and 
sources cited therein. 
29. For a careful study concluding that a causal relationship between easy divorce 
laws and marital breakdown cannot be proved, see M. RHEINsrEIN, MARRIAGE STABIL-
ITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW 261-307, 444-69 (1972). 
1000 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 75:994 
II. 
These developments, as might be expected, have placed consid-
erable pressure on the Church's courts. An increasing number of 
Catholics who have obtained secular divorces and have remarried out-
side the Church now desire to return to the sacraments. They have 
presented petitions ·before the ecclesiastical tribunals, and in many 
areas the number of declarations of nullity has increased dramatically 
over the past few years. 30 Part of this increase is attributable to 
changes in the procedure31 of the ecclesiastical courts, which now 
have an expedited procedure and can more readily grant a final judg-
ment. Some of these changes have also succeeded in making the 
decisions of the tribunals less visible and have thereby enabled the 
tribunals to render decisions for which the only rationale may be 
sympathy with the plight of the petitioner. 
Let us put these procedural developments to one side, however, 
and focus on the more visible changes in the rationale of decisions 
rendered. These changes have been considerable, and we cannot 
deal with all of them here. The most significant, however, involve 
a body of doctrine that has developed from the single principle that 
the insanity of one of the parties to the marriage vitiates marital con-
sent and renders the marriage void. A bewildering variety of terms 
has been employed to describe the expansion of this principle: lack 
of due discretion, emotional immaturity, psychic or moral incapacity, 
psychic or moral impotence. This lack of precision in terminology 
itself indicates the fluid and transitional nature of the doctrine. 
Below the terminological level three separate but overlapping 
strains of doctrine may be identified:32 a marriage may be annulled 
on the ground of (1) insanity, (2) lack of due discretion, or (3) 
psychic incapacity. The cases do not always distinguish clearly 
among these three grounds, and the doctrines, as we noted above, 
stem historically from an elaboration of the single ground of insanity 
(amentia) in the light of modem psychology and psychiatry, the find-
30. See CANON LAw Tuus1', THE CHURCH'S MATRIMONIAL JURISPRUDENCE ii 
(Westminster, Eng. 1975). 
31. See, e.g., the Motu proprio, Causas matrimoniales, in 63 AcrA APOSTOLICAE 
SEDIS 441 (1971); Procedural Norms for Matrimonial Cases, in 30 THE Jurus-r 363 
(1970). 
32. The categorization adopted here is that of the consultants for the revised 
Code of Canon Law. See 3 PONTIFICIA COMMISSIO Co01c1 Iurus CANONIC! RECOO· 
NOSCENDO, COMMUNICATIONES [hereinafter cited as COMMUNICATIONES] 69, 77 
(1971). The language quoted in the text at note 34 infra has apparently become 
the basis of canons 294-96 of the Schema for the revised Code. See ScHEMA oocu-
MENTI PONTIFICI QUO DISCIPLINA CANONICA DE SACRAMENTIS RECOONOSClTUR (1975) 
(unavailable to me at this writing). 
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ings of which Pope Pius XII commended to the Rota as early as 
1941.33 
The ground of insanity is basically confined to those cases in 
which one of the parties to a marriage had, as the consultants for 
the revised Code of canon law put it, "[a] total incapacity to conjure 
up [marital] consent because of a sickness or disturbance of the 
mind by which the use of reason is impeded."34 This is essentially 
the old ground of amentia, stripped, as a result of modem psychiatric 
teaching, of some of the more curious embellishments of the past. 
Lack of due discretion and psychic incapacity are more elusive. 
Included under these headings are (1) people who do not really 
understand what it is to be married (even though they might be able 
to recite the catechism's definition of marri;:tge), (2) people who 
really do not want to be married (even though they say they do), 
and (3) people who may understand and want to be married, but 
who suffer from some defect of personality that makes it a foregone 
conclusion that they will not be able to live up to their marital obliga-
tions. The first group are those whom the consultants describe as 
having "an incapacity stemming from a grave defect of discretion of 
judgment concerning the marital rights and duties to be mutually 
given and received."35 The second group may be covered in this 
description as well. The third group is probably composed of those 
whom the consultants describe as having an "incapacity to assume 
the essential obligations of marriage. "36 Plainly we are not dealing 
with insanity in the normally accepted sense of the term. Three re-
cent cases may serve to illustrate: 
(1) Two recent converts were married in December of 1959. · 
The behavior of the bridegroom caused "profound concern" to the 
officiating priest. Three weeks later the bride went home to her 
mother: " '[S]he [the bride] was broken up, completely in pieces, 
very frightened and in a state of nervous tension.' " She returned 
to her husband, left him again at Easter, and left him permanently 
in June. Two psychiatrists examined the record in the case but were 
unable to examine the husband. They concluded that he was a 
33. 33 Ac:rA APOSTOLICAE SEDIS 423 (1941). 
34. 3 CoMMUNICATIONES, supra note 32, at 77: "incapacitas totalis eliciendi 
talem consensum ob mentis morbum vel perturbationem qua usus rationis impeditur. 
" 
35. Id.: "incapacitas proveniens ex gravi defectu discretionis iudicii circa iura et 
officia matrimonialia mutuo tradenda et acceptanda . . . ." 
36. Id.: "incapacitas assumendi obligationes essentiales matrimonii ...• " The 
consultants then add: "proveniens ex gravi anomalia psycho-sexuali", a phrase which 
has provoked considerable discussion. See notes 42-45 infra and accompanying text. 
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psychopath and incapable of giving true marital consent in 1959. 
This finding, coupled with the history of the marriage, led the court 
to find nullity for lack of due discretion.37 
(2) John and Mary-of unstated age, though John was appar-
ently still in his teens-were married in 1944 while John was serving 
in the Air Corps. Two children were born of the marriage, but, 
in the winter of 1948-1949, John and Mary were divorced following 
Mary's adultery. John remarried civilly; his second wife died, he 
married for a third time, and in 1969 sought to have his first mar-
riage annulled. The court quoted extensively from psychological 
writing on immaturity and on the personality disorders that can lead 
to marital breakdown. The witnesses (no experts are mentioned) 
all commented on John's immaturity at the time of the marriage and 
the fact that he then seemed to be dominated by three forceful 
women: his mother, his first mother-in-law, and his first wife. The 
marriage itself was precipitated by the bride's mother's fear (appar-
ently unfounded) that her daughter had been compromised. The 
court concluded 
that John A. was suffering from the behavioral difficulty of im-
maturity beyond that to be expected of a person his age, rendering 
him incapable of assuming the permanent responsibilities of a 
lasting marriage with Mary B. Moreover, the situation of immatur-
ity perdured during the entire course of the attempted union and 
was not something that was curable by morally available means 
during the course of the marriage and in the place the couple were 
Jiving. Accordingly it was in effect a moral impotence rendering 
this marriage invalid. 38 
(3) A.B. married C.D. in 1969, when both were in their early 
twenties. After much wrangling, this childless couple obtained a 
civil divorce some two years after the marriage. A psychiatrist ex-
amined them both on the court's behalf and concluded that C.D. had 
a passive-dependent type of personality and a poor self-concept, 
while A.B. was egocentric and .found it difficult to "get close" to 
people. The marriage broke down because they were incapable of 
meeting, even minimally, each other's emotional needs. The court 
concluded that their "personalities and the operation of their joint 
systems together rendered each incapable of meeting the needs of 
the other and delivery of the object of the promises made at the time 
of marital consent was impossible." While the court chose to classify 
37. coram O'Ryan (Portsmouth Diocesan Tribunal, May 2, 1973), in 18 
L'ANNEE CANONIQUE 445-52 (1974). 
38. coram Provost (Helena, Mont., Diocesan Tribunal, n.d.), in 33 THE JURIST 
418, 428 (1973). 
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this case under a new heading, "essential incompatibility" (resting 
on the general provisions of canon 20 of the Code),30 it did cite cases 
involving lack of due discretion and psychic incapacity. It also found 
error in persona, because each party thought that he was marrying 
someone whom he could "relate to with [some] degree of meaning."40 
Now these are all decisions of tribunals in English-speaking 
countries, and it might be argued that ecclesiastical judges in coun-
tries which have a tradition of common-law jurisprudence and in 
which Catholics are in a minority tend to render decisions which are 
not in fact in conformity with the law of the Church as a whole. 
Certainly, some of the doctrinal developments in the area of an-
nulment have met with sharp criticism at the highest levels. For 
example, the Apostolic Signature, the Church's highest tribunal, has 
recently condemned the broad use of the doctrine of moral impo-
tence by the Dutch tribunals. But the condemnation need not be 
taken to upset the results in any of the examples given above. 41 
More to the point is the language of the draft of the revised Code 
which recognizes "incapacity to assume the essential matrimonial ob-
ligations" as a ground for annulment but goes on to describe that 
incapacity as one "arising from a serious psycho-sexual anomaly."42 
This latter phrase has provoked considerable criticism, and not only 
in the English-speaking world,43 but it does reflect the holdings (in 
the common-law sense) of the Rotal cases decided under the specific 
head of "incapacity to assume the essential matrimonial obligations." 
With but one possible exception, the holdings of these cases have 
apparently been confined to cases of nymphomania or homosexual-
ity. 44 The reasoning of these cases, however, is not so confined and 
39. CODE, supra note 3, canon 20: "Si certa de re desit expressum praescriptum 
legis sive generalis sive particularis, norma sumenda est, nisi agatur de poenis appli-
candis, a legibus latis in similibus; a generalibus iuris principiis cum aequitate can-
onica servatis; a stylo et praxi Curiae Romanae; a communi constantique sententia 
doctorum." 
40. coram Tierney (Patterson, N.J., Diocesan Tribunal, 1March 19, 1975), in 9 
STUDIA CANONICA 178 (1975). 
41. The text of the document, which is in the form of a letter to Cardinal Alfrink 
of the Netherlands, is given in 46 APOLLINARIS 294-98 ( 1973). While the matter 
is not free from doubt, it would seem that what the Signature is criticizing is the 
overly broad use of "moral impotence" as a substitute for analysis, rather than the 
doctrine of psychic incapacity itself. Indeed, the consultants to the Code Revision 
Commission suggest that the term "moral impotence" be abandoned entirely because 
of its possible confusion with physical impotence arising from psychological causes. 
See 3 COMMUNICATIONES, supra note 32, at 77. 
42. 3 CoMMUNICATIONES, supra note 32, at 77. 
43. See Navarrete, 'lncapacitas assumendi onera' uti caput autonomum nullitatis 
matrimonii, 61 PERIODICA DE RE MORAL!, CANONICA, LITURGICA 47 (1972). 
44. E.g., coram Pompedda (S.R. Rota, Oct. 6, 1969) (homosexuality), in 80/2 
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would seem to apply to any situation in which one of the marriage 
partners was psychologically incapable of assuming the marital ob-
ligations. 45 
Further, the language of the draft Code does not seem to encom-
pass a number of recent Rotal cases that annul marriages on the 
ground of psychic incapacity not of a psycho-sexual nature. These 
cases, apparently, fall under the heading of incapacity to give the 
marital consent rather than incapacity to assume the essential marital 
obligations. They are important because the people they concern 
are not insane in the normally accepted sense of the term and are 
not incapable, one would suppose, of making any other kind of con-
tract. One such case dealt with a neurasthenic woman who was an 
alcoholic, 46 two others with men diagnosed as having paranoid per-
sonalities. 47 The line of reasoning of these cases may be illustrated 
by a passage from one of them: 
Marriage in fact is fully completed by an interpersonal exchange, 
under which lies a healthy intrapersonal state of affairs. Therefore, 
if it is fully apparent in the judgment of the experts from the history 
IL DIRITIO EcCLESIASTICO 146 (1969); coram Lefebvre (S.R. Rota, Dec. 2, 1967) 
(homosexuality; alternative holding), in 93 MONITOR EcCLESIASTICUS 467 (1968); cf. 
coram Pinto (S.R. Rota, July 15, 1971) (nymphomania), in 97 MONITOR ECCLESIAS• 
Ticus 85 (1972); see generally Lefebvre, La jurisprudence rotale et l'incapacite 
d'assumer /es obligations conjugales, 24 REVUE DE DROIT CANONIQUE 376 (1974) 
(cataloguing other cases). The possible exception is the case coram Serrano, note 47 
infra, which I have chosen to treat as a defect of consent case. 
45. And it is so understood by many of the commentators. See Bernhard, 
Reflexion critique sur l'incapacite morale, 25 REVUE DE DROIT CANONIQUE 274 
(1975); cf. Zapp, lncapacitas im Sinn von Erfiillungsunvermogen des Ehevertrags-
Ein Neuer Ehenichtigkeitsgrund?, 141 ARcHiv FUR KATHOLISCHES KIRCHENRECHT 449 
(1972). 
46. coram Lefebvre (S.R. Rota, July 8, 1967), in 22 REVUE DE DROIT CANONIQUB 
200 (197Z). 
47. coram Anne (S.R. Rota, July 22, 1969) (semble), excerpted in Di Iorio, 
Causae nullitatis matrimonii secundum novissimam jurisprudentiam rota/em, in IL 
DoLO NEL CoNSENSO MATRIMONIALE 147, 150-51 (V. Fagiolo ed., Annali di Dottrina 
e Giurisprudenza Canonica No. 2, 1972) [hereinafter cited as coram Anne]; coram 
Serrano (S.R. Rota, April 5, 1973 ), in 30 REVISTA EsPANOLA DE DERECHO CANONICO 
107 (1974). For a discussion of the Serrano case, see Lavin, The Rota/ Decision 
Before Serrano, April 5, 1973: Some Observations Concerning Jurisprudence, Proce-
dure, and Risk, 36 THE JURIST 302 (1976). 
I can only echo here· the common plea of those concerned with modern canon 
law. If the Church is going to proceed with development of the law through jurispru-
dence, she must do better than publish the principal opinions of the Rota ten years 
after they are rendered. The case coram Anne, supra, is clearly one of the most 
important of the recent cases. It is cited in the Signature's letter to Cardinal Alfrink, 
supra note 41, in the Serrano opinion, supra, and in many others. The irregular pub-
lication of a selection of opinions in a half dozen scattered periodicals, frequently 
with only the in iure sections or even less, as in the case of the Anne opinion, is 
no substitute for the full opinion including the facts. (The facts could be suitably 
disguised if need be to protect the privacy of the parties.) 
April-May 1977] New Matrimonial Jurisprudence 1005 
of the life of person marrying that he was gravely deficient in inter-
and intrapersonal integration before marriage, he is to be considered 
as not up to grasping rightly the very nature of the common life 
ordained for the procreation and education of children that is matri-
mony, and hence equally incapable of rightly discerning and judging 
about that perpetual common life which he is to found with another. 
There is lacking in this case, therefore, that discretion of judgment 
which is necessary to make a valid choice of conjugal consort. In-
deed, he can remain capable of performing other duties which are 
extraneous to this inter- and intra-personal integration.48 
What the Rota seems to be doing, therefore, is characterizing the 
psychic incapacity to form a stable marital relationship as a defect 
of consent. However unsatisfactory this approach may be from an 
intellectual point of view, and however much the approach may differ 
from that of some of the tribunals in English-speaking countries, we 
are led back to the problem of evaluating psychological and psychiat-
ric evidence concerning a marital breakdown. I think it is safe to say 
that this is a problem being faced by the universal Church, not just 
by its English-speaking portions. 
ill. 
Forebearing both the technical and the theological objections 
which might be raised to these developments, one might initially con-
clude that the Church is simply opening the door to divorce and not 
saying so, that she has taken to dissolving marriages rather than con-
fining herself to declarations of their invalidity. The simple answer 
to this conclusion is that it fails to distinguish between a declaration 
of divorce based on events which occurred after the marriage and 
a determination of nullity supported by evidence that postdates the 
marriage. More careful examination, however, reveals that this dis-
tinction between substance and evidence is fraught with difficulties. 
To take a straightforward example, suppose a man who has never 
attempted sexual intercourse marries and shortly thereafter discovers 
that he is incapable of intercourse. He then disappears and so can-
not be medically examined. His wife petitions for a declaration of 
nullity on the ground of impotence. The canon law is clear: if the 
man was impotent at the time of the marriage, the marriage is null; 
if he became impotent after that time, the marriage is valid. 49 Yet, 
no one would claim that if the court used the fact of the man's in-
48. coram Anne, supra note 47, at 149 (emphasis original). Unfortunately 
the report of this case is most incomplete, and one can barely ascertain that it deals 
with a paranoid personality. 
49. CODE, supra note 3, canon 1068. 
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ability to have intercourse after the wedding as evidence of his im-
potence at the time of the wedding, it really was allowing super-
venient impotence as a ground of nullity. 50 
Unfortunately, when we move from the physical to the psycho-
logical, the distinction between the substance of the decision and the 
evidence supporting it becomes blurred. In the case of physical im-
potence, we are dealing with a condition that could have been veri-
fied medically at the time of the marriage. In the case of psychic 
incapacity, however, we are dealing with a disability that may be 
verifiable only after the marriage has taken place (and broken 
down). Further, there is a marked difference in the degree of cer-
tainty with which a physical and psychological diagnosis can be 
made. A well-trained physician can predict with virtual certainty 
that a person with a given anatomical structure will be incapable of 
intercourse. An equally well-trained psychologist or psychiatrist 
can frequently only make a probabilistic statement about whether 
a given marriage will break down, both because he rarely has the 
opportunity to test his theories on viable marriages and because the 
issue with which he is dealing-success or failure of an interpersonal 
relationship-is so much more complex than the capacity to perform 
the physical act of intercourse. 51 
Now all of this is of considerable significance for a legal deter-
mination of psychic incapacity. A psychologist wants to know why 
a marriage broke down or is breaking down and what he can do to 
restore these people or this marriage. He is not particularly inter-
ested in what might have been. But speculation as to what might 
have been is critical for the lawyer trying to determine psychic in-
capacity, because he must determine whether the parties were incap-
able of marriage or whether this was a marriage that simply did not 
work out. 
There is a further difficulty: in order to maintain a distinction 
between declarations of nullity and dissolution, we must distinguish 
between existing and supervenient conditions. A person perman-
ently incapable of intercourse at the time of the marriage cannot 
validly contract marriage; a person who later becomes incapable 
of intercourse may not have his marriage dissolved. But once again, 
when we move from the physical to the psychological, we can no 
longer draw such a sharp line. Virtually all psychologists and psy-
50. I am not saying that this is bow this hypothetical case would be decided by 
a modern ecclesiastical tribunal. 
51. For an excellent introduction to both the psychology and psychiatry of mari-
tal breakdown, see J. DoMINIAN, supra note 26. 
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chiatrists (whether of the Freudian persuasion or not) trace the roots 
of many, if not most, mental disorders back to the childhood of the 
patient. At the same time, few would maintain that the personality 
is fixed immutably upon entry into adulthood. Events in an adult's 
life, among which marriage is one of the most significant, operate 
on the childhood-formed personality and can affect it profoundly. 
Clearly, then, there is a problem created by the very nature of 
the psychological and psychiatric evidence that is now being admitted 
before ecclesiastical tribunals ( even assuming that we can find 
judges who are competent to evaluate such evidence) . The purpose 
of these sciences is not to solve juridical or theological problems; it 
is to explain the behavior of the person and to bring him to under-
stand why he behaves as he .does, so that he may be better able to 
deal with himself and with the society around him. Those who are 
familiar with the difficulties that American criminal courts have had 
with the "insanity defense" will recognize the analogy. 
IV. 
Indeed, the closer one looks the more striking is the analogy be-
tween the difficulties the Anglo-American criminal law has en-
countered with the insanity defense and those the ecclesiastical 
courts are encountering with psychic incapacity.52 Both Anglo-
American common law and the canon law begin with a notion, 
rooted deeply in the past, that an insane person is not responsible 
for his acts: he cannot commit a crime, he cannot perform a valid 
juridical act, such as marrying. Modem psychology and psychiatry, 
however, have deprived the law of its univocal conception of insan-
ity. Mental illness is now perceived as running along a spectrum 
from mildly balmy to totally bananas, and psychology and psychiatry 
do not offer any convenient place along the spectrum at which to 
draw a line demarking "insanity."53 Controversies abound as to 
where any individual is to be placed on this spectrum, and there is 
considerable disagreement as to the appropriate labels to apply to 
given combinations of symptoms. Psychiatrists and psychologists are 
52. Because of the speculative nature of this and the following two sections of 
this paper, I will not attempt to provide detailed documentation. Support for most 
of the factual statements and many of the judgments in this section can be found 
in A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1967); J. KATZ, J. GOLDSTEIN & A. 
DERSHOWIT.Z, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCIDATRY AND LAW (1967); A. WATSON, PSYCH!· 
ATRY FOR LAWYERS (1968); Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"-Why 
Not?, 12 YALE L.J. 853 (1963). 
53. Looking solely to convenience, the line could be drawn where the patient is 
totally out of touch with reality, a state that normally does not require a trained pro-
fessional to identify, but which is too limited even for traditional legal purposes. 
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divided as to the causes of mental disorders. Some trace the origins 
of many, if not most, such disorders to organic peculiarities; others 
lay more stress on environmental causes. There is also substantial 
disagr(?ement as to the curability, even more as to the likelihood of 
cure, of many mental illnesses. 
Further still, and perhaps most important, the notion of free will, 
of the voluntariness of human behavior, plays little or no role in the 
psychiatric or psychological scheme of human behavior, whatever the 
personal beliefs of individual psychiatrists or psychologists. The 
Anglo-American notion of crime and the canonic notion of marriage, 
on the other hand, assume free will. The insane person cannot com-
mit a crime because he lacks mens rea; the insane person cannot 
marry because he is "captive in mind."54 
Thus, when a psychiatrist or psychologist is called to testify in 
an Anglo-American criminal case or in a modern canonic marriage 
case, he is being asked to answer or to aid in answering a question 
which his science does not ask. This dilemma has produced strik-
ingly parallel results in the two systems. In canonic cases, as in 
Anglo-American criminal cases, the expert will frequently be asked 
and will attempt to answer the legal question that is before the court. 
Because this question is not within the realm of his expertise, his 
answer, not surprisingly, frequently seems to depend on his personal, 
as opposed to his scientific, views. The problem is particularly acute 
in the case of the canonic tribunals, which, as a result of their contin-
ental origins, 55 make more use of court-appointed than of party-
produced experts, seem to pay more deference to experts, and do 
not employ a jury for finding facts. Further, in both systems, even 
where they do not venture conclusions on legal questions, psycho-
logical and psychiatric experts tend to present their testimony in con-
clusory terms, as if the statement "X is a psychopath" should resolve 
the legal question. In both systems, too, we find examples of expert 
testimony offered when the expert has not personally examined the 
person whose psychological state is in question. 
The parallels are not confined to the behavior of experts. 
Courts in both systems have had considerable difficulty formulating 
a standard that takes into account psychological and psychiatric find-
ings. The pulling and hauling among the M'Naghten,rrn Durham,r,7 
54. See J. NOONAN, supra note 5, at 149-56. 
55. See Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, Phases of German Civil Procedure I, 
71 HARv. L. REv. 1193, 1242-43 (1958). 
56. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (Q.B. 1843); see W. LhFAVE & A. 
Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW § 37 (1972). 
57. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954); see W. 
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and ALl58 rules has its canonic analogy in the outpouring of litera-
ture on the merits and meaning of lack of due discretion, psychic 
incapacity, and moral impotence. 
Striking too are the parallels between the tentative solutions to 
the problem proposed or reached in the two systems. In both it has 
been suggested that the courts abandon their efforts to incorporate 
psychology and psychiatry within their findings of law and instead 
use these sciences only for determining remedies. 59 In this way the 
law, with its assumption of free will, remains the objective norm, 
while the intensely subjective findings of the psychological sciences 
would be used, in one case, to determine the treatment of the of-
fender, in the other, to determine whether one or both of the partic-
ipants in a broken marriage who have remarried outside the Church 
can return to the sacraments. 
Granting the parallels between the two systems and in light of 
the fact that the Anglo-American criminal law has been dealing with 
the problem for a longer time, is the experience of the Anglo-Ameri-
can system transferable to the canonic? I doubt it. We can warn 
the canonic judge of the dangers of letting an expert make legal 
judgments for him, but we cannot tell him how to make the ultimate 
judgment of responsibility, because there is no consensus on that is-
sue in our own system and because many of the judgments made 
in our system are concealed behind the verdict of an inscrutable jury. 
We can warn the canonic judge that psychiatric testimony given with-
out an examination of the patient is probably worthless, but we can-
not tell him what he is to do when the respondent does not appear 
and so cannot be examined. We can suggest_ that we, too, have con-
sidered the possibility of considering psychiatric evidence in a more 
informal setting in which only the remedy is at stake, but we must 
report that the most notable attempt to do so seems to have failed. 60 . _ 
The lesson, then, of this comparative exercise lies not in the spe-
cific solutions that can be transferred from one system to the other, 
LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 56, § 38, at 289-. In 1972 the District of Columbia 
Circuit overruled Durham and largely adopted the test developed by the American 
Law Institute, see note 58 infra, in Brawner v. United States, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. 
Cir. 1972) (en bane). 
58. MODEL PENAL CoDE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962), developed by 
the American Law Institute. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 56, § 38, 
at 292-95. 
59. See, e.g., Goldstein & Katz, supra note 52 (American criminal law); Haring, 
Internal Forum Solutions to Insoluble Marriage Cases, 30 THE JURIST 21 (1970) 
( canon law of marriage). 
60. See Louise II & Hazard, Insanity as a Defense: The Bifurcated Trial, 49 
CALIF. L. REV. 805 (1961). 
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but rather in what the developments in the Church courts can tell 
us generally about legal change and about the relationship between 
and among law, morals, and psychiatry. 
V. 
In a world such as ours in which change is the only thing on 
which we seem to be able to rely, the nature and causes of legal 
change should be a topic of great interest to those who are concerned 
with law. Yet surprisingly little has been written on legal change 
as a general phenomenon, 61 although examples of legal change in 
both historical and modern contexts are abundant. Perhaps legal 
scholarship has focused on particular legal changes rather than on 
change generally because lawyers tend to view legal development 
as a quintessentially conscious process, one in which rational and in-
formed choice explains all. Thus, the explanation for any change 
must be sought in the principles and policies consciously applied by 
lawyers, judges and legislators in the context of a given body of legal 
doctrine. In this view, legal change cannot be explained by a gen-
, eral theory like that of classical microeconomics-with its myriad 
actors, none of whom can perceive the effect of his acts on the sys-
tem as a whole-or structural anthropology, in which a wide range 
of social phenomena are seen to conform to a few subconscious 
arithmetical patterns. 
Certainly the rational element in law, as well as the wide range 
of possible changes that can occur in it, makes the fact and the nature 
of any given legal change more difficult to predict than, say, a rise 
in coffee prices after a crop failure in Brazil. Nonetheless, few 
would deny that the range of possible changes which can occur 
within a given legal system is limited by the nature of the society 
in which the system operates, by the nature of the institutions which 
create and apply the law, and by the legal ideas available at the time 
the change occurs. The question, then, is whether the diversity of 
societies, institutions, and legal ideas is so great, or the range of ra-
tional choice within the limits imposed by them so broad, that any 
61. After I had written this, I discovered some parallels between portions 
of this section and portions of R. POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 
(1923), L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967), and, somewhat surprisingly, H. HART, 
THE CONCEPT OF LAw (1961). My debt to Holmes is acknowledged in what follows. 
There are undoubtedly others from whose work I have unwittingly borrowed or who 
anticipated all or part of what I say. To them I apologize. I have also learned that 
Professor W. A. J. Watson of Edinburgh University has a book in the press with 
the intriguing title Society and Legal Change. I remain of the view, however, that 
legal change as a general phenomenon needs more study. 
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attempt to generalize about legal change is impossible, or that any 
generalizations will be devoid of predictive or descriptive power. 
I am inclined to think that the effort at generalization about legal 
change can yield results which are at least moderately interesting. 
Obviously, any statement, much less proof, of a general theory of 
legal change is well beyond the scope of this paper. Let me instead 
offer some propositions, illustrated by the Church's new matrimonial 
jurisprudence, which may prove to be of some generality, perhaps 
even of some use in constructing a general theory of legal change. 
Legal change can occur in a number of ways. A given legal rule 
may simply be reformulated, in the way that the Church's Code Re-
vision Commission is currently seeking to reformulate the Code of 
Canon Law. Further, or in addition to such reformulations, the im-
pact of a given legal rule can be altered ·by a change in the meaning 
of the terms of the rule. This is what the Church's courts are doing 
when they expand the notions of capacity to give marital consent or 
,to undertake marital obligations. In both cases we might say that 
the formal legal rule has changed, in the first case by a formal change 
in the terms of the rule, in the second by a change in the import of the 
terms. 
But legal change can also occur even though the formal legal 
rule remains unimpaired, because of a change in the pattern of initia-
tion of cases (parties or prosecutors bring more or fewer cases) or 
in the application of the rule (administrators or judges apply the rule 
with greater or less frequency than before). In the case of the 
Church's marriage laws, for example, there is evidence both of a 
greater number of cases being brought and of less enforcement than 
before.62 
Legal change with the rule formally unimpaired can also occur 
when there is a substantial change in the underlying social phenome-
non to which the rule applies. The Church could continue to apply 
the old rules exactly as they are stated in the Code: "marriages" 
are indissoluble and may only be annulled in a few, limited circum-
stances. But if "marriages" are not the same as they were at the 
time the Code was promulgated, then a legal change has occurred. 
Of course, marriages could change in ways that are quite irrelevant 
to the rule of indissolubility. Without pressing the borders of rele-
vance, however, social changes which undermine the stability of mar-
riage clearly are relevant. A legal rule that bolsters an institution 
62. The limits of this type of change are desuetude ( the total lack of use of a 
given legal provision) and revival (the application of a legal rule which has not been 
used for some time). But these are only the limits on a type of legal change that 
may also occur less dramatically. 
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which has numerous other societal underpinnings is quite different 
from a legal rule that bolsters an institution shorn of much of its 
social support. Indeed, if we define a legal rule to include not only 
its formal statement but also the social context to which it applies, 
we would say not only that a legal change has occurred but also that 
the legal rule itself has changed. 63 
Now all of these types of legal change do not occur only in re-
sponse to changes in the nonlegal context of the rule, but all of them 
occur sometimes in response to contextual change, some of them oc-
cur usually in response to contextual change, and the last-named oc-
curs only in response to contextual change. We can illustrate this 
with some examples of contextual change. Suppose that an ordi-
nance passed in 1820 permits "vehicles" in the park between sunrise 
and sunset. 64 With the invention of the automobile a legal change 
must occur. Normally it will be of the formal type. Either a body 
empowered to make rules will amend the rule specifically to include 
or exclude automobiles, or a body empowered to interpret the rule 
will decide that automobiles should or should not be included within 
the definition of "vehicles." But even if no formal legal change oc-
curs-the park police, for example, simply assume that automobiles 
are included and the rulemaking and rule-interpreting bodies never 
consider the matter-a legal change will have occurred. Whether 
automobiles are allowed in the park or not, the function and effect 
of a rule about vehicles in the park is different in a society which 
has automobiles from what it is in one which does not. 
Because of the eminently rational quality of law, contextual 
changes as dramatic as the invention of the automobile normally pro-
duce a reconsideration of the rule itself. The prediction that recon-
sideration-and hence the opportunity for formal change-will oc-
cur becomes less certain where the contextual change takes place 
slowly or in proportions rather than absolutes. For example, if there 
is a significant increase in the number of murders in an otherwise 
static society, a legal change will occur even if this increase is not 
perceived and the formal rule remains unimpaired. Either the en-
forcement rate will .go down because courts or prosecutors cannot 
handle the caseload, or the enforcement rate will remain constant 
63. A most striking example of this type of change is found in S. MILSOM, 
0
THE 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM (1976). According to Milsom the writ 
of right and the possessory assizes were originally designed to force lords to follow 
their own customs with regard to their tenants. With the decline of the importance 
of the lords' courts they became the remedy for the owner and the possessor respec-
tively. 
64. An example borrowed unwittingly from H. HART, supra note 61, at 125-26. 
April-May 1977] New Matrimonial Jurisprudence 1013 
or go up, as a result of greater effort by enforcement institutions or 
neglect of other types of cases. In all of these instances there will 
be a change in pattern of the enforcement of the rule, either a re-
duction in the rate or an increase in the number of cases involving 
the rule, and that change in pattern is itself a legal change. The 
significance of the rule in the total scheme of societal rules will have 
changed. This change may of itself produce a reconsideration of 
the rule. 
Suppose, however, that the contextual change is not one in the 
number of cases generated but in the nature of the phenomenon to 
which the rule applies. The number of murders may remain con-
stant, for example, but the type of murder may shift significantly 
from gangland slayings to uxoricide with Saturday-night specials. The 
enforcement rate may remain the same; the formal rule may remain 
the same, but a legal change has occ4rred. The rule is now being 
applied to a different type of case from that to which it was pre-
viously applied. 
This last type of change is the hardest to perceive and hence the 
least likely to produce formal reconsideration of the rule. In a so-
ciety less self-conscious than our own there may be no awareness of 
the change. Granted self-consciousness, however, this type of con-
textual change may produce a reconsideration of the rule, particu-
larly if the contextual change also produces an increase in the num-
ber of cases calling for the application of the rule and if there is a 
significant group in the society that wants the rule changed. 
All these conditions seem to be filled in the case of the Church's 
marriage laws. Marriage today is not the same as it was 100 years 
ago; thus the Church's rules are being applied to a different phenom-
enon. A self-conscious society perceived that fact. Further, more 
marriages are unstable today than they were in the past. In the con-
text of the canon law as it stood, this was bound to produce an in-
crease in the number of applications for annulment. Further still, 
a significant group, those divorced civilly and remarried who wanted 
to return to the sacraments, desired a change in the rule. Not sur-
prisingly, the rules are being reconsidered. 
Reconsideration, of course, does not mean that there will be a 
formal change in the rule or a change in its administration. The 
outcome of the reconsideration is not as easy to predict as the fact 
of reconsideration. The process of reconsideration currently taking 
place in the Church, however, seems to fit into a pattern which may 
be of wider applicability. 
Once change in social circumstances has forced reconsideration of 
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a legal rule, the rule itself usually cannot resist change of its own 
force. If formal change is not forthcoming, some way will be found 
to make it fit the "felt necessities" of the new circumstances. 00 In 
the case of the rule that consummated, sacramental marriages are 
indissoluble, "consummated," for obvious reasons, has not proved 
to be malleable, nor, for less obvious reasons, has "sacramental"; so 
the definition of "marriage" itself has been bent to the point where 
the definition of the canon law is now far from that of the secular 
law or of the man in the street. 
What I am suggesting here is that the force of precedent alone 
cannot keep a legal rule intact in the face of perceived contextual 
change if there is a substantial group within the society that desires 
change in the rule. Now there may be other forces, such as groups 
whose interests are served by the rule, which can keep the rule in-
tact. There may even be such groups within the Church, although 
given the uncontested nature of most marriage cases in the Church, 
the mechanism by which such groups might apply pressure to 
countervail that of the petitioners in the Church's courts must, at 
best, be indirect. 66 
To what extent can we say that if there is no social force keeping 
a legal rule in place that rule will change even absent an underlying 
contextual change? The question implies that legal rules have no 
force as such, and I am not sure that this proposition can be held 
as a general matter. Absent the catalyst of contextual change, a 
legal rule, even one supported by no substantial social force, may, 
at least in some legal systems, remain intact simply because it is a 
rule. The requirement in some of our states of a straw man to ef-
fectuate certain conveyances of real estate may illustrate this point. 07 
Absent contextual change, then, the law can maintain itself either 
because of the conservatism of the people who are subject to it or, 
and perhaps particularly, if there is a specialized group whose func-
tion is to know and apply the law. Granted contextual change, 
however, my suggestion is that innate conservatism or a specialized 
65. The phrase, of course, is Holmes'; 0.W. Holmes The Place of History in Un-
derstanding Law, in THE LIFE OF TIIE LAW 3 (J. Honnold ed. 1963). 
66. I am aware, of course, that the Church courts appoint a "defender of the 
bond" in marriage cases whose function it is to argue in favor of the marriage, even 
if none of the parties are so arguing. See CODE, supra note 3, canons 1586, 1968-
69. Since he has no personal interest in the case, however, and since he represents 
only an abstract proposition, "the bond of marriage," the statement in the text re-
mains unaffected. 
61. See 4A R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1f 616, at 669-71 (P. Rohan 
ed. 1977). 
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group cannot maintain a legal rule, unless there is a substantial group 
in the society whose wishes the rule serves. 
Nonetheless, legal rules do seem to have some force of their own. 
Indeed, if a rule involves a legal idea that is deemed fundamental, 
that idea will leave traces in the legal system, even if the rule is 
changed. 68 Without pausing to consider the implied actor in the pas-
sive "deemed," the meaning of the weasel word "fundamental" and 
the exact import of the metaphorical "traces," let us illustrate the 
workings of this proposition in the context of the modern canon law 
of annulment. The doctrine of psychic incapacity now being de-
veloped by the Church's courts is not the same, either formally or 
in result, as divorce for cause, much less divorce on the ground of 
irretrievable marital breakdown, still less divorce by consent. Many 
people are still denied annulments when they would have had di-
vorces under any of these secular standards. Even if the church 
courts come to achieve the same results as the secular courts, the 
rule, we can confidently predict, will not be stated in the same way. 
Thus change has occurred, but it is a change in which the older rule 
has left its traces. 
It might be objected that I have chosen a bad example; a legal 
change made by a conservative legal system and one made by way 
of case development, rather than by an institution specifically em-
powered to change the law. Surely there are instances where funda-
mental legal ideas have been swept away without a trace? Perhaps 
there are, but the phenomenon is rarer than one might think. 
This is not the place to attempt to demonstrate the extraordinary 
durability of fundamental legal ideas, but perhaps a word is in order 
about three instances in which it might seem that such ideas can be 
obliterated: conquest, revolution and codification. Rare is the con-
queror who totally supplants the legal system of the conquered coun-
try. Total supplanting normally occurs only where the conquering 
people absorb the conquered, but that is not an instance of a change 
in a legal system but its destruction. Perhaps revolution can also 
result in the destruction of a legal system, particularly if the revolu-
tionaries follow Jack Cade's advice and kill all the lawyers. But 
when one searches for examples, the United States, France, Russia, 
and the former African colonies all seem to illustrate the staying 
power of the legal ideas which have prevailed before. Similarly, re-
cent work with codifications would suggest that even those codifica-
tions which involve substantial imports of foreign ideas are shaped 
68. See L. FuLLER, supra note 61, at 56-70; s. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF nrn COMMON LAW xi-xii (1969). 
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in the process of their implementation by the fundamental legal ideas 
of the previous system. 69 
What I am suggesting, therefore, is that even if that marvelous 
continental creation, the legislator, can see his way clear to think in 
totally new categories, the people who must apply the law cannot. 
Thus, every legal change, at least as it is applied, is bound to bear 
the imprint of the fundamental ideas which underlay the old rule. 
"Historic continuity with the past," as Holmes said, "is not a duty; 
it is only a necessity. "70 
All of this, however, has carried us further than we had to go 
in order to explain the change in the Church's rules for annulment. 
A quite simple model will describe, if not explain, the phenomenon: 
contextual change in the form of an increasing number of secular 
divorces and remarriages and resultingly excommunicated Catholics 
puts pressure on the legal system for change. Once the contextual 
change forces reconsideration of the rule, change in the rule is likely 
if change is desired by a substantial segment of the society. In our 
case there is a change desired by petitioners (more annulments) that 
the forces in favor of the old rule do not seem to have been able 
to resist. But the force of the fundamental idea (the indissolubility 
of marriage) represented by the old rule limits the extent of the 
change (the petitioner must still show that something was wrong with 
the marriage at the time it was contracted) and determines the shape 
that the change takes (redefining marriage so as to characterize non-
marriages as those unions which are going to [or, perhaps, are likely 
to] break down). 
VI. 
Now all of this may be, and is intended to be, a bit shocking. 
We have suggested that the behavior of the Church's courts fits into 
a pattern which may be found in legal systems generally, including 
the most secular. Further, this pattern is one which is based on con-
textual change and the desires of pressure groups. Except for our 
suggestion of the peculiar staying power of "fundamental legal 
ideas," we have said nothing that would indicate that rules which 
embody values or principles prove any more resistant to change than 
those requiring straw man conveyances at common law. Further, our 
examples of contextual change have not included changes in the val-
69. See generally A. WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (1974). 
70. 0.W. HOLMES, SPEECHES 67 (1934). 
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ues of the people subject to the legal rules. Such a change may be 
taking place within the Church with regard to the indissolubility of 
marriage, but the behavior of her courts can be adequately explained 
without reference to it. 
One would have expected, however, that where a moral prin-
ciple, thought to be based on the words of the Divine Founder of 
the Church, was at stake, a secular theory of legal change such as 
that suggested above would not apply. One would also have thought 
that here, if any place, courts would have perceived the limits of the 
usefulness of modem psychology and psychiatry for the resolution 
of legal problems. Yet change seems to proceed in the Church's 
law much as it does in the secular, and the encounter with the 
psychological sciences produces the same all-too-familiar judicial re-
actions that it has produced in the Anglo-American criminal law. 
Possibly these two phenomena are connected. Possibly the way 
the Church's courts have changed the law and the way they have 
reacted to psychological and psychiatric evidence both tell us some-
thing about the relationship between law and morality, although I 
must confess that this must be the most tentative of my "comparative 
reflections. "71 
We have emphasized above that the Church has a legal system-
a body of legal doctrine separate from her moral code, law-making 
and law-applying institutions, and legal specialists, set apart by their 
training and function from the group as a whole. 72 We have tried 
to view the behavior of these specialists in the light of a theory of 
the way such specialists behave, and we have found that they con-
form to our expectations. An unstated assumption of this analysis 
has been that legal specialists come from the society in which they 
are performing their functions. Further, it is probably true of all 
specialized groups-and the probability is enhanced when we are 
dealing with an elite which is trained to be reflective and rational-
that they will only perform their functions well if they believe that 
they are serving some useful function in the society of which they 
are members. I can think of no case in which a legal rule has been 
consistently applied by a specialized legal group that did not believe 
71. Recent literature concerning the relationship between law and morality in. the 
context of the Church's marriage laws includes: DIVORCE AND RBMARRIAGE IN THB 
CATHOLIC CHURCH (L Wrenn ed. 1973); M. WFSJ: & R. FRANCIS, ScANDAL IN THE 
AssEMBLY (1970); THB BoND OF MARRIAGE (W. Bassett ed. 1968); V. POSPISHIL, 
DIVORCE AND REMARRIAGE: TOWARDS A NEW CATIIOLic TEACHING (1967). 
72. See generally Abel, A Comparative Theory of Dispute Institutions in Society, 
8 !..Aw & SocY. REV. 217 (1974). 
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this. Even the prosecutors of heretics and witches in the late Middle 
Ages and Renaissance thought they were doing good, however diffi-
cult we may now find it to believe. 
Now it is quite possible to conceive of a useful function for a 
rule that marriages are indissoluble. The harm that divorce causes 
both to the parties and particularly to their offspring is well docu-
mented. The fact that most western secular laws have come to the 
conclusion that rigid rules against divorce cause even more harm 
does not mean that no rational legal system could come out differ-
ently. 
The problem for the Church's tribunals lies not so much in the 
rule itself as in the way it is enforced. In the vast majority of cases, 
the tribunals are not being called upon to decide whether a divorce 
should be granted but rather what should be done about people who 
are already divorced in fact and frequently are divorced according 
to some secular law as well. In virtually all the individual cases the 
tribunals are called upon to judge, the judges must have great diffi-
culty seeing how an application of the no-divorce rule is going to 
do any good. At stake in these cases is not whether the parties to 
the original marriage could have made it work but the fact that there 
is nothing that can be done to make it work now. 
It is possible to conceive of a legal system which justifies itself 
not in terms of the good that it is doing for the society which it con-
trols in this world, but in terms of what it is doing for the members 
of that society in the next world. Divorce is a sin; those who divorce 
and remarry will be damned; therefore we will withhold from the 
divorced the sacraments of the Church until they leave their current 
spouses (who are not their spouses in the eyes of God) and either 
return to their former spouses or at least remain celibate. 
It is just at this point that the evidence of psychologists and psy-
chiatrists has its greatest effect. While they cannot pronounce for 
certain that the prior marriage was doomed to failure, they can and 
do cast doubt on the responsibility of the parties to the prior marriage 
for its failure and hence on the subjective sinfulness of its break-
down. This doubt reinforces a long tradition in the Church that only 
God can truly judge the subjective morality of an act and that, to 
the extent that such judgments must take place on earth, they are 
made in the internal forum of the confessional, not in the external 
forum of the courts. Thus, the ecclesiastical judge is faced with the 
certain knowledge that he can do nothing to save the prior marriage, 
grave doubts (which increase with the strength of the psychological 
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evidence) that he is making the right judgment about the moral situ-
ation of the petitioner, and considerable unease as to whether this 
latter judgment is even his proper role. 
A possible justification for retaining the strict rule is its in 
terrorem effect. If the rule were relaxed, so the argument goes, 
people whose marriages could be saved would not make an effort 
to save them because they would realize that divorce was possible. 
The argument involves a kind of moral numbers game: the salvation 
of two souls is put in peril for the sake of the salvation of many. 
Further, it may be doubted whether the Church's canon law-as op-
posed to her moral code-has a significant deterrent effect today on 
couples whose marriages are in difficulty. This justification may ex-
plain why it is that some ecclesiastical judges continue to apply the 
old rule. The fact that the trend seems decidedly away from that 
rule would suggest that the justification is not sufficient for most. 
It is tempting to generalize from the above: where the enforce-
ment of a legal rule that incorporates a moral principle falls most 
heavily on those whose moral responsibility for violation of the rule 
is doubtful, and where enforcement of the rule in a given case will 
not rectify the evils that the rule was designed to prevent, the en-
forcers of the rule will modify it. It is not that hard cases make 
bad law; it is that hard cases demonstrate that the law is bad. 
* * * 
Because the theory suggested here does not purport to be a gen-
eral one, I may be excused from venturing any more than a few sug-
gestions of the directions in which the Church's legal system is likely 
to go. I have suggested, however, that the fundamental difficulty 
that the Church courts are facing results from the fact that they are 
enforcing a legal rule that incorporates a moral principle and hence 
is peculiarly resistant to change and, further, a moral principle be-
lieved to be of Divine origin. Despite this fact, the Church's courts 
have responded, if only partially, to a "felt necessity" for change, 
although in so doing they have produced a body of doctrine that 
is neither consistent nor comprehensible. - It may well be that the 
Church's courts have reached the limits of the capacity of any legal 
system and that no legal system can cope intelligently with the inter-
play of modern psychiatry and the concept of moral responsibility. 
If this is correct, we might venture the prediction that we will see 
marriage cases removed from the juridical sphere of the Church's 
1020 Michigan Law Review rvol. 15:994 
activities, 73 although powerful institutional forces would militate 
against such a move. 74 Certainly, if we may venture into the nor-
mative, it would seem that this is what ought to be done. 
73. See text at note 59 supra. The dejudicialization of the decision whether a 
divorced and remarried person is to be allowed to return to the sacraments has al-
ready occurred in the Anglican and Eastern Orthodox churches. See THE ARCH• 
BISHOP OF CANTERBURY'S COMMISSION ON THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF MARRIAGE, 
MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND THE CHuRcH (1971). 
14. See note 14 supra, 
